Citizens and scholars are again confronted with a question presented by necessity and the law: Because no law can anticipate every contingency, how can any set of laws remain fundamental and practical? How can discretion be made compatible with democratic consent?
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Preface
The scholarly understanding of presidential power rests on two distinctions. The first distinction concerns the extent of the president's formal powers and the place of the presidency in the constitutional order. The other distinction contrasts the Founders' presidency against the modern presidency by emphasizing the extraconstitutional powers of twentieth-century presidents. The first distinction is often characterized as arising from the differences in the political thought of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, that is, between a generous and a narrow reading of the Constitution's grant of authority to the president. The second distinction supposes that the modern presidency escaped from the constraints imposed by the Founders' careful plan to separate and check power by looking beyond the Founders' Constitution for its resources and became, in some cases, precisely what the Founders tried to prevent. 1 Because recent presidents eagerly exploit the constitutional hinges that allow the presidency to be strong, and because they bolster this strength with extraconstitutional devices, it is easy to conclude that the current presidency is both Hamiltonian and modern. As this scholarly understanding of the presidency puts it, Hamilton's case for implied powers, with its broad reading of the vesting clause in Article One, opened the space for later presidents to claim, as Theodore Roosevelt did, that they possess any power, not forbidden by the Constitution, to act on behalf of the people and for FDR to argue that the presidency needs the institutional resources to secure rights under modern conditions. 
But this formulation points to an obvious difficulty: how compatible is the seemingly democratic modern presidency with the Hamiltonian presidency? The modern presidency is both powerful and popular, but the one seems to undermine the other. Because elections have become more democratic, and because the science of polling allows, as Dick Morris taught us, "every day" to be "election day in modern America," a president can be both caretaker and creature of the popular will. Yet presidents increasingly rely on secrecy and administrative fiat to pursue their ambitions. Presidents use executive orders to avoid working with Congress, and, since Watergate, presidents have asserted executive privilege while calling it something else. Among scholars and presidents, the current understanding of the war power is that the president, not Congress, is responsible for determining when the nation is at peace or war. At the same time, presidents appeal to the people to justify their policies and their extraordinary acts of executive power.
Moreover, several scholars have found that the modern and premodern classifications rest on an uneasy theoretical foundation. Harvey Mansfield Jr. has argued that the distinction between the Founders and the moderns fails to appreciate the extent to which the modern presidency grows out of the modern doctrine of constitutionalism, which allows the formal and informal presidency to occupy the same office.
2 And, as Stephen Skowronek has written, the distinction between the Founders' presidency and the modern presidency fails to appreciate the more serious similarities among presidents who face similar political challenges, namely being associated with or opposed to a resilient or vulnerable regime.
3 Twentieth-century presidents have new tools, but does this make them new?
More important, even though modern presidents employ methods in the spirit of the Hamiltonian presidency, they have not wholeheartedly embraced it. FDR, for example, appealed to Hamilton's defense of national power only after discrediting Hamilton's suspicion of democracy.
4 Although Hamilton's reputation as an opponent of democracy is perhaps undeserved, his reasoning in The Federalist No. 70 illustrates the dilemma for modern presidents: where is the president who would argue that if republican government is antithetical to an energetic executive, then it must mean that the republican form, not energy in the executive, must be discarded? Where is the president who will Preface ix say in public, as TR did in private, that the people's love of Jefferson is a discredit to his country?
The Problem with Inventing the Presidency
More than relics of a lost world, such questions force us to examine the heart of the modern presidency. Today, presidents use their elections to claim a mandate from the people; they claim that the Constitution confers upon them the ultimate power of defending the Constitution and therefore tacitly grants them the power to use any means to do so; they appeal directly to the people to get Congress to pass their proposals and to encourage executive officials to do their bidding; and they carefully cultivate public opinion in order to make these appeals more useful. These aspects of the modern presidency are well known and well studied, but they can be better understood with reference to their institutional origins. The case for mandates presumes a particular kind of presidential selection and would have been incomprehensible under the original Electoral College; the argument for the constitutionality of executive prerogative requires a particular understanding of the relationship between necessity and fundamental law; and appeals to the public had to first be defended as a legitimate, and useful, practice in democratic government. Even a quick reading of the Constitution and its interpretation in The Federalist reveals that none of these developments can be taken for granted. Rather, somebody had to invent them.
But, as scholars affiliated with American Political Development argue, such inventions come about at particular intersections between political and institutional paths.
5 Or, as Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek put it, instead of searching for "prime movers and master organizing mechanisms," scholars would do well to present "more circumspect specifications of order."
6 Put differently, the functional bias behind the question of who invented a particular institutional reform should be replaced by less normative and more historically subtle investigations of the interaction between established commitments, institutional rules, and new politicswhat Orren and Skowronek call "intercurrence."
7 Consider, for example, the rival explanations of the apportionment scheme in the U.S. Senate. According to one interpretation, equal apportionment reflects the sovereign status x Preface of the states.
8 According to another, the apportionment scheme grew out of the primary concern for the size of the Senate, which was paramount because the Senate was meant to be an elite body in the style of the House of Lords.
9
But if Frances E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer are to be believed, such functional accounts should be replaced by one more attentive to "path dependency."
10 For these scholars, equal apportionment arose because small-state delegates at the Constitutional Convention assembled a coalition that managed to protect equal apportionment by connecting it to past steps in the path: voting rules (which accorded each state one vote) and bicameralism (which presumed that one of the two houses of Congress be small) worked to the advantage of the small states and resulted in the Great Compromise. The same has been said of presidential leadership. Presidents can be agents of institutional change, yet the opportunities for change are confined by historical contingencies and previously traveled paths.
But, as the example of equal apportionment in the Senate suggests, the attractiveness of path dependency is also its danger. It can include rival, functional, interpretations even as it attempts to explain events as "historical contingencies." Could equal apportionment remain a viable option without the previous commitment, held by some would-be advocates of proportionality in apportionment, that the ideal Senate was a small Senate?
11 At the same time, there is a second functional explanation for equal apportionment: some of Madison's opponents insisted on equal representation because they shared a commitment to state authority, if only because the check on national authority would serve their respective interests.
12 In other words, equal apportionment in the Senate arose because the small states, with voting rules that were advantageous to their interests, exploited particular functional theories about what a senate should be.
All this is to say that the third president provides an important case study for those who study institutional development. More than any other president -with the possible exceptions of Madison and Wilson -Jefferson was a lifelong student of political change, and, with Madison, he was the founder of the nation's first opposition party. Consequently, Jefferson had
